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INTRODUCTION
This article builds on recent contributions to the study of civil–military relations
(CMR) by broadening the focus beyond democratic control to encompass other
dimensions and levels of analysis. There are problems with the classical literature, as has
recently been noted by some scholars.2 The first problem is that CMR has dealt almost
exclusively with issues of control. In the more established democracies, the literature
focuses on how control is exercised; in newer democracies, on how it can be achieved.
What is scarce in the literature is attention to what the military and other security forces
do; that is, their roles and missions and how effectively they implement them. Second,
the CMR literature consists mainly of detailed case studies that are difficult to general-
ize to other times and places.3
Based on on-going work in research, teaching and policy advising in many countries,
the development of the sub-discipline of CMR requires both a comparative focus on
institutions, and attention to factors relevant to the effective implementation of roles
and missions. In our academic and applied work in democratic civil–military relations,
we have come to conceptualize civil–military relations as a trinity comprising democra-
tic control, effectiveness and efficiency.4 The thesis of this article is that a national
security council (NSC) can be a core element for democratic CMR in that it enhances
civilian control and the effective implementation of roles and missions.5 In this article
the authors will not focus on efficiency, to be defined below, since an NSC has little
impact on this dimension.
Few countries have NSCs that even begin to fulfill the two fundamental functions of
democratic control and effectiveness. Based on recent research in eight countries, the
title NSC itself may have little meaning and there is little commonality of experience
from one country to another. Until recently, in South America and Turkey, an NSC
connotated military control in an authoritarian regime. Thailand’s Council for
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National Security was behind the military coup in that country on 19 September 2006,
while there was until recently concern in Bangladesh that proposals to create an NSC
will mark the end of democracy.6 In short, the existence of an organization called
“NSC” implies neither democratic civilian control nor effective strategy formulation
and co-ordination. Nor does past success with an NSC guarantee continued success, as
evidenced by the process involved in the US decision to invade Iraq.
Many newer democracies, however, claim to have NSCs based on the model of the
United States. In the authors’ experience, few of these NSCs actually exist, and those
that do play virtually no role in national security and defense, or in democratic
civil–military relations. Even if the US NSC did currently function as well as in the past,
and may well again in the near future, there are still three main reasons to question its
relevance as a model, especially for newer democracies. First, the United States is a
wealthy country in which the most relevant departments, Defense and State, are deeply
entrenched, highly “stovepiped” bureaucracies. This makes inter-agency co-ordina-
tion, although a high priority, extremely hard to achieve. Second, a key to an effective
NSC is an adequate, well-trained staff; the US NSC staff consists of approximately 200
highly qualified and motivated officials and military officers seconded from their home
services and departments, who consider serving on the NSC to be a plum appointment.
Few countries have anything like these human resources to draw on. Third, the US
Congress, in the National Security Act of 1947, imposed the NSC on the presidency, as
part of a package of legislation to ensure that a sneak attack on the United States, such
as Pearl Harbor, would never again occur.7
THE CMR TRINITY: CONTROL, EFFECTIVENESS AND
EFFICIENCY
As already noted above, civil–military relations is a trinity comprising democratic
control, effectiveness and efficiency. The authors believe this conceptualization
captures what governments throughout the world are attempting to achieve with their
security forces. The authors have also found that their conceptualization encompasses
all that they find useful in the literature and programs on security sector reform.8
The first leg of this trinity is democratic civilian control. It must be emphasized that
democratic civilian control does not exist unless it is grounded in, and exercised
through, institutions ranging from organic laws that empower the Ministry of Defense,
oversight committees and executive bodies that direct the police forces, to budget
processes and civilian control of promotions within the military and intelligence
agencies.9 Accountability operates, if at all, through these institutions. If these institu-
tions are not in place, democratic civilian control is only a façade. While the range of
such institutions varies from country to country, an NSC-type can be one of these insti-
tutions.
The second leg of the trinity is the effectiveness with which security forces fulfill their
assigned roles and missions. There are several basic considerations in the conceptual-
ization of this leg. First, there is a very wide spectrum of potential roles and missions for
the various security forces. Second, roles and missions cannot be effectively imple-
mented without adequate resources, including money, personnel, equipment and


































training. Third, few roles or missions in the modern world can be achieved by only one
service in the armed forces or one civilian agency, without the involvement of other
services and agencies. Thus “jointness” and inter-agency co-ordination are indispens-
able to security decision-making. The place to do this is in an inter-agency forum, such
as a national security council. Fourth, to make things even more complicated, which is
life in the real world, there are the paradoxes of evaluating effectiveness in the context
of deterrence, wherein wars are avoided precisely because a country is perceived not to
be vulnerable; or an intelligence organization supplies information that either prevents
or induces a specific desired response, without the knowledge of anyone but those
directly involved. Fifth, and last, most of the imaginable roles and missions will be
carried out within a web of coalitions or alliances, e.g. NATO, the African Union, or the
United Nations. In short, there are complicated methodological issues and nuances
involved in evaluating effectiveness, and analysts must grapple with them to begin to
understand what is required for the armed forces and other security forces to do what
is expected of them.10
The third dimension of the trinity is efficiency in the use of resources to fulfill assigned
roles and missions. This dimension is complicated initially by the wide variety of
potential roles and missions, and the difficulty in establishing measures of effectiveness
for any one, let alone a combination of them.11 Again, there are several requirements,
beginning with a statement of objectives and an NSC-like organization can play a role
here. In most instances there is no defining document, such as a national security
strategy, that lists objectives and establishes preferences for one set of goals over another.
Democratically elected governments fail to produce such documents, first, because their
opponents will quickly point out the inevitable discrepancies between goals and achieve-
ments, and second, because an established inter-agency process is necessary not only to
define but also to assess priorities.12
In recent research on the function of NSCs in eight countries, the authors have dis-
covered that an NSC-type organization can play an important role in two of these three
dimensions of CMR. Before elaborating on this key point it is necessary first to review
the main roles of an ideal NSC.
THE ROLES OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILS
There is a minimum of seven main roles for NSCs to play.13 The first is to inform and
advise the chief executive on events and policies in the areas of national security and
defense. The NSC is where all the information and the principal officials interact on
politics and policy, formal and informal processes, information and actions, and the
views and interests of concerned agencies or ministries. In this role, the NSC serves to
aggregate and integrate data and then provide the most accurate and comprehensive
information on which to base policy, a function that is especially important during
crises. The second role of the NSC is to co-ordinate among the players, establish
consensus and see the policy through to implementation. Any policy, if it is to be
effective, requires careful co-ordination for both its development and, just as impor-
tantly, its implementation. If any of the likely players are not involved, or some degree
of consensus achieved, implementation will not take place. Third, and of importance
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mainly in presidential or semi-presidential systems (e.g., Romania), the NSC is
normally the point of contact that facilitates communications with the legislative
branch on security policies coming from the executive. In all political systems, except
those with extremely weak legislatures, the legislature plays a role in passing laws that
define policy, passing budgets to implement policy, and conducting oversight to ensure
that the policy is implemented. Thus, an NSC should play a central co-ordinating role
for policies that have to do with national security and defense.
Fourth, most countries have multiple intelligence agencies. Even if there is a director
of the main civilian intelligence agency, such as the Director of Central Intelligence –
now Director of National Intelligence – in the United States, the Director of the
Brazilian Intelligence Agency, or the directors of the Romanian Intelligence Service
and Foreign Intelligence Service, there are typically other intelligence agencies within
the military and police. An NSC or similar organization is needed to see that the intel-
ligence product is made available to what are mainly civilian decision-makers within the
executive, in a form that is useful to them. Intelligence that has not been sufficiently
evaluated and integrated will be of less value to policymakers.
Fifth, if a government is to produce documents such as decision memoranda as does
the United States, or national security strategies (NSS) as the United States and
Romania (and several other countries rhetorically aspire to), the most likely place to
develop them is in an NSC. Security assistance donors put emphasis today on the
creation of NSS by recipient countries, yet very few are able to do so because they lack
viable NSCs.
Sixth, a policy, even one developed through a robust inter-agency process resulting
in consensus, is unlikely to be implemented unless there is some organization with the
power to demand information and penalize agencies and individuals if they do not
provide the information in a complete and timely manner. An NSC, with the power of
the chief executive behind it, can ensure some level of co-operation and implementa-
tion.
Seventh and last, an NSC can handle foreign relations beyond the generally diplo-
matic and formal level that is the purview of foreign ministries or US Department of
State, who tend to follow their own bureaucratic agendas. This is particularly important
in the area of security, as there may be many tracks involved (e.g., military, political,
multinational); having an organization such as an NSC at the center can best co-
ordinate them. Furthermore, an NSC can help prepare the chief executive for meetings
with foreign officials and handle foreign trips so that the meetings are optimally useful.
Obviously, no NSC in the real world can completely fulfill all of these roles, but if a
government wants any or all of them dealt with, it is normally an NSC that does it. In
view of these seven possible roles, it seems clear that the main contribution of an NSC,
from the perspective of civil–military relations as a trinity is, first, effectiveness, then
democratic civilian control, and finally, at a much lower level, efficiency. Effectiveness
is primary because all seven of the roles lead towards developing and implementing the
best possible national security and defense policies. Or, as Hew Strachan says with
regard to the United States, “. . . the National Security Council exists to make strategy,
to align policy with operational capabilities.”14
The NSC enhances democratic civilian control in terms of providing the elected
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chief executive the tools, structure and personnel to keep track of what different actors,
including the military, police and intelligence organizations are about, especially if they
are working in secret. An NSC might play a role in efficiency by defining, in an NSS, an
administration’s goals for national security and defense. It is difficult for us to imagine
how a country can have an effective and efficient policy, especially one under democra-
tic civilian control, without an NSC or equivalent organization or organizations. In this
regard, it is useful to look at the experience of different countries as they develop, or fail
to develop, these organizations.
GLOBAL EXPERIENCES: EIGHT CASE STUDIES
This section draws upon research conducted by the authors in eight countries where
the issue of a National Security Council, or one or more of an NSC’s roles, are being
discussed. They are in different regional areas, at different stages of democratic transi-
tion or consolidation, and confront different national security and defense challenges.
Each case will be discussed with an eye to drawing lessons regarding both the roles of
an NSC and the obstacles to developing an organization that can fulfill one or more of
these roles.15 It must be emphasized from the very beginning that in most countries with
which we are familiar, there is absolutely no discussion at all about NSCs and their
potential roles.16
Mongolia
There is an NSC in Mongolia, created early in that country’s transition to democracy
in the mid-1990s.17 The NSC is composed of the popularly-elected president, the
prime minister, and the speaker of the Great State Hural, or parliament. There is also
an Office of the NSC with its own secretary and director, but the office is not powerful
and mainly does research for the three primary members.
After a good deal of questioning of Mongolian officials during visits spanning several
years, the authors finally determined that the NSC was created in the aftermath of the
long Soviet experience to balance off the positions with the greatest power in the
Mongolian new democracy – the president, PM and speaker – so that no single office,
or person, can monopolize power.
With pressure on Mongolia from the United States to develop national security
documents, there is currently interest in strengthening the Office of the NSC, if not the
NSC itself, in order to better co-ordinate the large number of agencies (the armed
forces, border guards, disaster relief agency, foreign ministry, etc.) involved in national
security and defense. Officials are also concerned with reforming the domestic intelli-
gence agency, the GIA, and better linking the intelligence product to policy: the
emphasis is on roles two, four and five. Therefore, if resources are made available, it
will fulfill at least three of the main functions of co-ordinating policy, fusing and
co-ordinating intelligence, and developing documents.



































Although there has been much discussion in Chile over many years in the post-Pinochet
era regarding national security councils, the civilian leaders do not want a formal NSC.
During the military regime of General Augusto Pinochet (1973–1989), the govern-
ment established a large set of organizations dominated, if not wholly owned, by the
military.18 These included the COSENA (Consejo de Seguridad Nacional), the
CONSUSENA (Consejo Superior de Seguridad Nacional), and CONSUDENA
(Consejo Superior de Defensa Nacional)19 that deals with the income from copper
exports. Part of the transition from authoritarian to democratic government involved
neglecting these holdovers and creating new, largely informal, mechanisms of control
and co-ordination.
In November 2004, the government and opposition reached agreement on 48 con-
stitutional reforms, most of which had been pending since they were first proposed in
1990. Changes to Article 95 transformed the COSENA from a decision-making body
into a purely advisory entity, balanced the number of civilians (the presidents of the
Republic and of the Senate, the Supreme Court chief justice, and the comptroller
general) and military personnel (commanders in chief and the general director of the
Carabineros – uniformed national police) serving on it, and reserved for the President
the power to call the Council into session.20
Policy co-ordination and implementation is exercised at Cabinet level by the
Ministry of the Presidency and the Cabinet itself. The so-called “Political Committee”,
which includes the ministers of the interior, presidency, government (spokesman), and
finance, is in charge of co-ordination, including issues related to security or defense. In
sum, Chile’s civilian and military leaders have worked out a series of understandings,
which have been or are in the process of being implemented in constitutional amend-
ments and in law, which seek to institutionalize democratic civilian control and
maximize effectiveness, purposely without an NSC.
Spain
Spain is a semi-parliamentary regime with a largely symbolic king. The Popular Party
government of Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar (1996–2004) placed much emphasis
on issues of national security and defense. This not only applied to domestic issues, as
in the on-going battle against the terrorism of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA),
but also in Spain’s close collaboration with the United States and Great Britain in the
invasion and subsequent war in Iraq. These internal and external demands, and the
awareness that the intelligence system was not up to the government’s demands, led
to proposals to create an NSC organization and general inter-agency system that
would fulfill one, four, five and six of the roles highlighted above.21 These are
informing and advising the executive, co-ordinating policy, fusing and co-ordinating
intelligence, overseeing policy implementation, and enhancing foreign security
relations.
Due to their loss in the elections on 14 March 2004, however, and the coming to
power of the Socialist Party of Jose Luis Zapatero (re-elected in 2008), who is not at all
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interested in national security and defense issues, these proposed laws lapsed. The
lesson drawn from the experience of Spain is that when a country seeks to establish a
robust and dynamic policymaking process in national security and defense, it will want
to create institutions similar to those of other countries. This assumption is validated
in the cases of El Salvador and Japan, although it must be noted that El Salvador is a
presidential system.
El Salvador
El Salvador has had an NSC, or Consejo de Seguridad Nacional, since 1992. It includes
the president, the ministers of` defense, foreign affairs, interior and finance, the director
of the National Civilian Police, and the director of the State Intelligence Organization.
It meets routinely every other week and can be called into special session if necessary.
This NSC had some life, and filled mainly roles one and two, until 2005. Then, after El
Salvador furnished troops to the US-led coalition in Iraq, the Salvadoran leadership
received threats, supposedly from al-Qaeda, which they took seriously. They thus
amended the original decree that had created the NSC, and established a Permanent
Secretariat to, in the words of the then (since deceased) secretary, “provide integration,
co-ordination, and continuity of the NSC.”22
With the Permanent Secretariat, which is composed of five seconded officers, mainly
intelligence specialists, they also broadened the liaison function to include other gov-
ernmental agencies as well as other countries and international organizations.
Therefore, in addition to doing more in roles one and two, the leaders’ goal was also to
better integrate intelligence (role four) by including the intelligence officers, develop an
NSS (role five), and enhance international liaison (role six). El Salvador is an excellent
case study of a country that perceived a threat, in this case from international terrorism,
and concluded that it had to create an NSC to most effectively respond to the threat.
Romania
In Romania, the NSC equivalent is the National Supreme Defense Council (CSAT),
established as the body that co-ordinates all national defense and security related activ-
ities, as well as Romanian participation in international security efforts, collective
defense within military alliances, and peace and reconstruction operations.23
CSAT is composed of ten members: the non-partisan president as chair (who is also
the supreme commander of the armed forces), the prime minister as deputy chair, the
minister of industry and trade, the minister of defense, the minister of foreign affairs,
the minister of interior, the head of the Political Analysis Department of the Presidency,
the director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, the director of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Service, and the chief of general staff. The goal of the CSAT is to achieve political
balance; some members are directly subordinated to the president (the security adviser
and the directors of the intelligence agencies), and some members are directly subordi-
nated to the prime minister (the cabinet ministers and the chief of staff), while the chief
of staff is also indirectly subordinated to the president, who is supreme commander of
the military. This enables CSAT to ensure that responsibilities are shared between the
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presidency and the cabinet, preventing the president from having a monopoly on
security issues.24
The Council has a permanent secretariat to organize meetings and act as an interface
between CSAT and all relevant authorities working in the national security field. The
Secretariat functions within the presidential administration, is headed by a secretary
(who also serves as an advisor) appointed by the president, and has ten permanent
members transferred from other public agencies (two from the Ministry of Defense,
including the head of the Secretariat, between one and three from the Ministry of
Administration and Home Affairs, between one and three from the Romanian Intelli-
gence Service, one or two from the Foreign Intelligence Service, one from the
presidential administration, and one from the Special Telecommunications Service.25
The CSAT’s responsibilities include all of the seven roles of an NSC. More specifi-
cally, among other roles, the CSAT informs and advises the president on issues
pertaining to national security and defense; co-ordinates the activities of all security
institutions; produces security-related documents (for example, the national security
strategy and military strategy); integrates all information provided by the intelligence
agencies and other national security institutions; initiates measures vis-à-vis declaring a
state of siege and/or emergency, declaring and canceling a state of war and initiating,
suspending or terminating specific military actions; co-ordinates policies developed by
the executive branch with the legislative branch (for example, in the event of war the
CSAT will submit a plan to mobilize the national economy and a budget for the first
year of war for parliamentary approval). In addition, the CSAT endorses various draft
policies initiated by the government on national security topics; the organization of all
security institutions; the organization and functions of the CSAT itself; preparation of
the populace, economy and territory for defense; and drafts budget proposals and allo-
cations for the security institutions; handles foreign relations (for example, CSAT
approves the circumstances in which foreign troops are allowed to enter, pass through,
or deploy on Romanian territory, and endorses draft international treaties and agree-
ments relevant to Romania’s national security); monitors the implementation of CSAT
decisions; and fulfills other functions with regard to national security and defense.26
Brazil
Unlike much of Latin America, Brazil’s foundation in laws is comprehensive and
robust, the bureaucracy is strong, and there is a true civil service based on exams and
merit.27 Although the Ministry of Defense and the ABIN (Brazilian Intelligence
Agency) are new (the former was founded in 1999 and the latter in 2001) and still
nascent bureaucracies, and the government lacked a national security strategy until
2008, it does have the main component of a real NSC called the Secretariat for Institu-
tional Security (GSI) in the Office of the Presidency. This council is physically located
next to the president’s offices, and the Minister Chief has ready access to the president.
The GSI serves as the permanent secretariat for a national defense council. It conducts
studies, monitors and provides policy guidance on crises, develops position papers, and
decree laws, among other functions, for the presidency under the leadership of the
Minister Chief of State (Ministro de Estado Chefe). The ABIN is situated under the


































GSI, as are the offices for Military Affairs and the National Anti-Drug Secretariat; the
various intelligence services are also under the umbrella of this office.
The GSI grew out of the Military Household (Casa Militar) of the military regime
(1964–1985), which had evolved into the Secretariat for Strategic Issues; GSI was
formally established by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1999. Therefore, in
contrast to the ABIN and MoD, the GSI was built on prior institutions rather than
created entirely from scratch out of very different organizations. Even though the MOD
was also founded in 1999, its relations with the strong and autonomous military
services are still being worked out, while the former regime’s National Information
Service was abolished in 1991, long before the ABIN came into being.
Unexpectedly for its staff, the GSI took on a greater role with the democratic change
of administration from Fernando Henrique Cardoso to Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva in
2003, when the latter discovered that it was not enough to issue orders, draft decrees
and the like, since the strong bureaucracies in Brazil would not automatically act or
respond. Increasingly, the GSI oversees the implementation of policy (role seven on our
proposed list). This is particularly onerous as there are, for both symbolic and political
reasons, between 30 and 37 separate ministries and other agencies, and any issue in
national security and defense will involve, at a minimum, six of them. The members of
this large and diverse cabinet are political appointees who represent some or all of the
20 political parties in Congress; thus, neither the cabinet nor a smaller NSC group meet
regularly or get much done. There are some 300 officers and officials in the GSI, all of
them seconded from the services, ministries, ABIN, Federal Police, universities, etc.
Nobody, as in the presidency in general, is a permanent employee. In terms of the seven
possible roles of an NSC, the Brazilian GSI fulfills them all.
Japan
Behind the policymaking apparatus of the government of Japan, though not apparent
on organization charts and legislation, is a political system that has remained largely
unchanged for decades.28 The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, formed in
1955, has maintained a dominant political position as the party in power, and has
largely set the path for policymaking in both economics and security affairs over the last
half century. With few exceptions, the LDP and Tokyo’s career bureaucrats have
formed the core of Japan’s policymaking apparatus. Decades of public acceptance for
this arrangement provided democratic legitimacy. In addition, the government’s heavy-
handed – in some cases overbearing – civilian control of its military has severely
restricted the size, capabilities, roles and missions of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces,
thereby sharply limiting the use of the military as an instrument of national power.
Japan has a formal “Security Council”, composed of the prime minister, the
ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary. This body
authorizes security issues to be presented to the Cabinet – where executive authority
lies – for decision. The body that functions more closely to our concept of an NSC,
however, is the prime minister’s staff, or Kantei. The Kantei is the Prime Minister’s
official residence, where a staff of seconded government officials is located to support
the flow of information from Japan’s ministries and agencies, and between the Chief
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Cabinet Secretary and Prime Minister. Although the Kantei staff attempt to co-
ordinate policies, they primarily maintain communications between the different
ministries and the prime minister. When Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came into office
in September 2006, one of his main agenda items was to establish a real national
security council to better formulate and implement a more robust national security and
defense policy. The effort to create a real NSC stalled with the departure of Prime
Minister Abe in August 2007.
With regard to intelligence, there is no authorized means to provide classified infor-
mation to the Diet, Japan’s parliament, other than to those parliamentarians who hold
executive branch positions, nor is there a procedural mechanism to conduct closed
sessions of the Diet, thereby precluding a forum for legislative debate on classified
matters.
The United States
The US NSC was created by Congress in the National Security Act of 1947, which also
created the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.29 By all
accounts it fulfilled the seven roles defined above extremely well during most of the
post-Second World War era, under highly diverse chief executives. There is general
agreement, however, that it has not been doing as well during the George W. Bush
Administration, either in general terms or in most of the specifics. Personal interviews
with high-level military officers and civilians involved in defense policy, as well as
numerous “insider” books by journalists, make clear that the NSC did not function as
it should in the lead-up to the 2003 war in Iraq.30 The military historian Hew Strachan
stated forcefully, “. . . the National Security Council exists to make strategy, to align
policy with operational capabilities. But in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq it did not
do so . . . The clashes and competition between the State Department and the Depart-
ment of Defense, like those between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CentCom [US
Central Command, sic], were not reconciled: strategy fell through the cracks.”31
In terms of the specific roles of an NSC, all have been fulfilled at one time or another
since its creation in 1947. Between 2000 and 2009, however, most of them were not.
The authors understand from observers and participants that the main reason for this
situation lies with the president, who did not empower his national security advisor suf-
ficiently to force agreement between the strong personalities in the Defense
Department, the unusually powerful vice president’s office, and the State Department.
The casualties were consensual policymaking and the development of policies that were
both logical and practical. The NSC could not fulfill its designated roles or tasks
because key actors, with the support of the president, failed to make it work.32 The main
lesson here is that even an institution with 60 years of history, at the pinnacle of US gov-
ernment power, however well-structured and staffed, can work only if the chief
executive creates the conditions for it to work.33
The summary of the findings from the eight country studies is found in Table 1.


































Table 1: The Functions of a National Security Council – Actual, in Abeyance,
or Desired
ANALYSIS
Based on this survey of eight countries which have, have had, or desired to have, real
NSC-like institutions, it can be briefly stated that they link to the two main dimensions
of our trinity of CMR in the following way. Control, as the democratically elected
executive uses an NSC to formulate, co-ordinate and oversee security and defense
policy. They enhance effectiveness by developing strategies, guidance, mobilizing
resources, and overseeing implementation.
Even in those democracies where there has been interest in developing (Spain and
Japan) or reformulating (Mongolia) a National Security Council, there are impedi-
ments. In the eight countries described above, there has been interest in and discussion,
at some level of the government, on developing an NSC or in achieving some of the
functions that an NSC is designed to fulfill. Excluded, therefore, are the vast majority
of countries where there is no interest at all, or the NSC is at times an instrument of
military control (e.g., Thailand and Turkey). Included is Chile, where there has been
discussion and there are organizations that might seem to be NSC equivalents, but due
to its authoritarian past do not have a functioning NSC.
Although the US NSC has in the past fulfilled all seven of the functions, five were in
abeyance during most of the George W. Bush Administration. What lessons can we
draw from this initial, admittedly partial, review? At a minimum, the creation of an
NSC requires a broad perception of the need to formulate and co-ordinate national
security and defense policy. This perception continued from the past in Brazil, where
the GSI evolved from the Casa Militar, and emerged in El Salvador and Romania with
the perception of regional and international threats. In Mongolia there is interest, due
to the vague awareness of some values in having an NSC, but so far the political
resources in Mongolia are lacking. The initiative to create an NSC in both Spain and
Japan disappeared with a change of government in which the leader with the political
will was replaced by another lacking it.
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Countries 1. Inform 2. Co-ordinate 3. Liaise 4. Fuse and 5. Develop 6. Oversee 7. Enhance
& Advise Policy with Co-ordinate Documents Policy Foreign
Executive Legislature Intelligence Including Implement- Security
NSS ation Relations
Mongolia N/a Desired N/a Desired Desired N/a N/a
Chile N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a
Spain Desired Desired N/a Desired N/a Desired Desired
El Salvador Actual Actual Actual Actual N/a Actual Actual
Romania Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual
Brazil Actual Actual N/a Actual N/a Actual Actual
Japan Desired Desired N/a N/a N/a Desired N/a
United States Actual In abeyance In abeyance In abeyance Actual In abeyance In abeyance
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The case of the US during the George W. Bush Administration shows that even the
model NSC will fulfill only those roles or functions that the chief executive is willing to
put his political resources behind. In short, an NSC is an instrument of the chief
executive. If he, or she, wants to demote it, as has President Alvaro Uribe in Colombia,
or largely ignore it, as with President George W. Bush, it will not fulfill some or even any
of its possible seven roles.34 After taking office on 20 January 2009, one of the first
important measures of the Barak Obama Administration, was to issue, on 13 February,
Presidential Policy Directive–1 on “Organization of the National Security Council
System”. According to some analyses, one of the major problems of the previous
administration’s NSC was a lack of dissenting opinions. Consequently, PPD–1
expanded the NSC to include agency heads such as the Attorney General, Secretary of
Energy, and Secretary of Homeland Security, along with the UN Ambassador.
There is currently a debate in the US regarding the NSC on whether or not it can be
reformed in order to increase effectiveness. President Obama has expanded the NSC
and appointed a retired Marine General to be his National Security Adviser. There has
been much commentary in the media over how active, or inactive, the Adviser has been.
The Congressional Research Service has focused on the organization of the system.
And the very large, dynamic, and well-connected Project on National Security Reform
(PNSR) recommends “. . . the establishment of a President’s Security Council (PSC)
that would replace the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council . . .
[and] the statutory creation of a director for national security (DNS) within the
Executive Office of the President. The director would be responsible for tasks encom-
passing the high-level operation of the national security system . . . that go beyond those
of the present assistant to the president for national security affairs.”35
CONCLUSIONS
In line with recent scholarship on CMR, the authors believe that to understand better
how civil–military relations actually work in the real world, scholars should look at insti-
tutions and study them comparatively. In their research the authors have found that it
is not enough to look at democratic civilian control of the armed forces. Although
necessary, control alone is not sufficient to our conceptualization of CMR. Indeed, in
looking at how the armed forces, and the security sector in general, operate in such
areas as peace support operations, intelligence and counter-terrorism, there has been
an increasing awareness of the need for effectiveness. When the institutions nations
create to achieve effectiveness are analyzed, some kind of inter-agency process, often
centered in an NSC, is deemed necessary. This issue is deceptive, however, because
many military dictatorships used, and still use, institutions with this name to co-
ordinate their non-democratic policies.
Furthermore, while many countries include NSCs in their constitutions and govern-
mental organization charts, these bodies have minimal roles. From our experience,
there are only a handful of countries with NSCs that function as proposed in models,
including Brazil, El Salvador and Romania, while the case of the United States demon-
strates that past experience is no guarantee of continued success. Our study of CMR,
through the prism of NSCs, suggests that politics must be at the center of any analysis
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of how institutions are adopted and allowed to function, or not function, to enhance
national security. The current attention and debate in the US on rejuvenating or
restructuring the NSC further emphasizes the potential importance of an NSC.
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